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ABSTRACT
In today’s digital world, personal data is being continuously col-
lected and analyzed without data owners’ consent and choice. As
data owners constantly generate data on their personal devices, the
tension of storing private data on their own devices yet allowing
third party analysts to perform aggregate analytics yields an inter-
esting dilemma.
This paper introduces PAS-MC, the first practical privacy-preserving
and anonymity stream analytics system. PAS-MC ensures that
each data owner locally privatizes their sensitive data before re-
sponding to analysts’ queries. PAS-MC also protects against traf-
fic analysis attacks with minimal trust vulnerabilities.We evaluate
the scheme over the California Transportation Dataset and show
that we can privately and anonymously stream vehicular location
updates yet preserve high accuracy.
1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you wish to work out at the gym, though you would
like to check how crowded the gym is before hand. Should ev-
eryone currently at the gym be required to publicly disclose their
sensitive location information every minute in order to allow us to
check how crowded a particular gym is? Clearly this is a privacy
concern. The question we seek to answer is how to harvest sen-
sitive data (e.g., current location) from mobiles in real-time while
simultaneously providing strong privacy guarantees.
Recently researchers have taken a renewed interest in data pri-
vacy. The Netflix Prize privacy fiasco is a recent example where
public disclosure of a large data set was not properly sanitized. This
privacy oversight resulted in Netflix being sued [44] as several in-
dividuals being de-anonymized. The literature describes a number
of mechanisms for protecting user privacy while allowing useful
data analytics [50, 40, 42, 26]. Among these, differential privacy
has gained broad acceptance. It adds differential private noise to
the aggregate query results in such a way as to hide the presence or
absence of any individual user. A key strength of this approach is
that it provably protects the privacy of individual users.
Currently, we can think of three different data harvesting models
whereby sensitive data is collected for analytics. The first is a cen-
tralized model whereby companies today collect sensitive location
information into centralized data repositories. For various reasons
(e.g., regulatory mandates, privacy policies or ethic policies) this
sensitive data is only collected and not publicly disclosed. There
are no strong privacy guarantees. Confidence in the protection of
sensitive data is left to regulatory policies. Additionally, these cen-
tralized data repositories are central points of trust vulnerabilities
which continue to invite data breaches [17, 45, 37, 47, 38, 4].
The second is the original differential privacy mechanism that
assumed a trusted central database maintaining all users’ personal
data [24, 26]. Data is then privatized upon disclosure (either upon
release from the centralized repository or by the third party receiv-
ing the data). An example of this is offered by Google Waze which
collects real-time vehicle locations and has a data sharing agree-
ment with multiple city agencies [33]. However, data owners must
make strong trust assumptions with a centralized database. Namely,
the database must be trusted to halt all queries once the differential
privacy budget has been exhausted. Also, data owners do not have
granularity in consent and control mechanisms over the release of
their personal data. In the past, trust in centralized systems safe-
guarding privacy has been violated [2, 55].
Finally, the last is a distributed model, used in PAS-MC, which
enhances the prior two models and ensures that data owners release
a privatized and anonymized version of their sensitive location in-
formation. Data owners maintain complete control and consent
over the utilization of their sensitive data. Upon receiving a query
from a remote analyst, the data owner queries its local database and
produces a truthful answer. In this model, data collection agen-
cies maintain and store only privatized data thus mitigating any po-
tential trust vulnerabilities. Privacy-preserving distributed stream
monitoring systems have been proposed before [30, 9, 25]. How-
ever, they all require some form of synchronization, or are tailored
for heavy-hitter monitoring only (i.e., they can only report on a
fraction of the data).
This paper presents PAS-MC the first practical, anonymity and
privacy-preserving stream analytics system that collects data in real-
time from mobiles and provides strong privacy guarantees. In PAS-
MC, each data owner’s personal data resides on the data owner’s
own device. Once receiving a query, each data owner does not di-
rectly respond to the query with the truthful answer. Instead, the
data owner locally privatizes their answer based on the randomized
response mechanism [53, 29] such that only privatized data is re-
leased (rather than the original answer). Randomized response sat-
isfies the local differential privacy requirement such that each data
owner’s response is independently differentially private, regardless
of the amount of differential privacy noise added by other data own-
ers or system components. That is, for a response of "Yes" the data
owner has an equivalent probability of having or not having the
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
04
89
2v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
7 A
pr
 20
16
sensitive attribute §4.1. Thus, randomized response eliminates the
need for strong trust assumptions regarding the aggregation mech-
anism in a distributed setting. Additionally, there is no need to syn-
chronize data owners (e.g., no MPC amongst data owners) or other
system components for adding the appropriate differential private
noise, leading to low latency and achieving real-time analytics.
To anonymously transmit the data owners’ randomized responses
to a data aggregator, each data owner generates functional secret
shares (FSS) [6]. FSS slices the response into multiple shares.
Then, each share is individually transmitted to an independent ag-
gregator. Each aggregator independently and asynchronously pro-
cesses each share. At the end of an agreed upon epoch, all aggre-
gators share their results. As long as there is at least one honest
aggregator, the data owners’ anonymity is guaranteed. Eventually,
the aggregators generates the query result based on the received
randomized and anonymized responses, and transmits the query re-
sult to the appropriate analyst. Thus, it is not possible for a mali-
cious adversary to discover which data owner transmitted a particu-
lar randomized response from within the anonymity set. FSS hard-
ness assumptions does not depend on a particular pseudorandom
number generator (as opposed to a homomorphic pseudorandom
generator [18]) which allows PAS-MC to be efficient and scalable
seen as shown in §5.3. We can privately and anonymously stream
220,000 data owners’ location data with minimal probability of col-
lision with a key size of 112KB.
To evaluate our privacy-preserving approach we examine a ve-
hicular case study utilizing the California Transportation Dataset.
We examine both rush hour and off peak to demonstrate our pri-
vacy mechanism works well for small sample sizes §5.2.
In this paper, our contribution is a software which that the first
time achieves all of the following for a real-time system:
1. a privacy scheme that allows each data owner to operate in-
dependently without coordination or a centralized service,
2. a scalable anonymity system resistant to traffic analysis, and
3. disruption protection for the anonymity scheme
2. GOALS AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We now describe the system goals, performance goals, threat
model, and privacy goals of PAS-MC. Figure 1 shows an overview
of the flow of queries and responses and demonstrates that the pri-
vatization occurs before reaching the aggregator.
2.1 System Goals
The system should support analysts who wish to run a popu-
lation study. The analysts issue a query for those interested data
owners that privately and anonymously reply. Analysts are able to
formulate long-standing signed queries. These queries continually
elicit privatized responses during the defined query epoch. The an-
alysts are deemed to be reputable, e.g., Department of Transporta-
tion, National Institutes of Health, or Centers for Disease Control.
Each analyst controls an aggregation server.
We use a vehicular example as motivation. Vehicles today have
an array of sensors that collect position, speed, acceleration, and
CO2 values. Analysts (e.g., researchers, municipalities, automak-
ers, insurance companies) are able to utilize this information to
study road and traffic patterns for autonomous vehicles. For exam-
ple, real-time traffic information and CO2 levels allow municipali-
ties to reroute autonomous traffic to reduce traffic congestion and to
reroute heavy polluters to reduce pollution levels. While real-time
mobile crowdsourcing has high utility and benefit to society, real-
time sensor data harvesting has serious privacy risks. Autonomous
passengers (data owners) do not wish to be constantly tracked, as
this violates location privacy.
The queries are propagated using roadside WiFi units or LTE
repeaters. The requests may also be piggybacked on responses to
traffic information requested by the driver, or in response to peri-
odic driver polls. To reduce traffic O/H, or in response to periodic
driver polls the queries may be posted to an edge website that mo-
biles of a certain class frequently check (e.g., taxicab website).
The long-standing queries are needed to be fetched only once by
each data owner. Data owners have the choice of answering the
query and can configure their devices to respond if certain condi-
tions are met (e.g., whitelisting or blacklisting certain sensors or
response frequency).
The responses of data owners and aggregation processing pro-
ceeds in epochs. That is every epoch each data owner privately and
anonymously transmits their respective answer to the aggregator
servers. The aggregation servers then compute the final aggregate
using the received responses within this epoch. Epochs are defined
on the order of seconds.
As there is a tradeoff between privacy and utility, the system
should strike a superior balance the tradeoff of strong privacy and
utility. We strive for a small percentage of error for both sparse and
large datasets.
2.2 Performance Goals
The system should scale gracefully as compared to related anonymity
systems which provide strong guarantees against traffic analysis.
Network bandwidth should be minimal as compared to existing
bandwidth hungry systems [13, 52].
2.3 Threat Model
Aggregation servers may try to collude, though we assume there
is at least one honest aggregation server. Each aggregation server
is owned by a set of distinct reputable analysts.
Aggregation servers are expected to be available and online, so
we do not consider denial of service attacks whereby data owners
are not able to transmit their responses. We assume aggregation
servers are honest-but-curious, i.e., servers do not corrupt the mes-
sages though can attempt to read all messages.
In the mobile environment, users frequently go online and of-
fline. Thus, a malicious observer can perform traffic analysis tech-
niques by observing the sender, receiver, and frequency of mes-
sages. The malicious observer essentially performs performs "in-
tersections" across the sets of active users in order to de-anonymize
them [43, 21]. Intersection attacks across long durations (many
epochs) are very difficult to overcome for anonymity systems. We
do not consider these attacks in this paper. However, PAS-MC
works within a single epoch and our scheme scales to the order of
hundreds of thousands of data owners; thus, making it increasingly
difficult to execute these intersection attacks.
There are two pollution attacks we consider: a malicious data
owner who repeatedly answers a query in order to inflate the ag-
gregate sum and a malicious data owner who repeatedly answers a
query within a single epoch. To prevent a single answer, such as
a large number, from distorting the aggregate sum, we utilize a bit
vector response which limits the data owner to only replying ’0’
or ’1’. To prevent multiple responses within a single epoch, data
owners are limited to a single response per epoch per query. Thus,
malicious data owners which try to provide spurious answers will
remain limited in their impact and can be eventually detected and
blacklisted (certification revoked).
We do not consider malicious analyst who provide falsified ag-
gregated results. Economic incentives may help defer this. We also
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Figure 1: PAS-MC system overview. (a) illustrates that the data owner has control and consent over the privatization release as opposed to
the centralized mechanism which requires strong trust assumptions regarding the aggregator adding differential private noise.
look to address this in future work.
2.4 Privacy Goals
We assume all queries are signed and from reputable analysts.
This provides provenance in the case of a dishonest analyst that
may formulate a specially crafted query that attempts to depriva-
tize a data owner. Analysts may publicly publish the aggregated
answers as the answers are differentially private. Malicious ana-
lysts do not gain any advantage from creating multiple sybil an-
alysts, as the data owners privacy deficit will be decremented for
each answer and data owners are able to detect duplicate queries.
Data owners’ privatized location responses should leak no more
data than if they were not participating in the population study.
Each data owner retains their own data on devices that they control
and manage. The data owners then choose to participate in respond-
ing to each query. All responses before they leave the data owner
are privatized and anonymized. The anonymization mechanism re-
quires only a single honest aggregation server to participate and that
there are at least two honest data owners. The privacy mechanism
should satisfy the local differential privacy criteria. Thus, there is
no centralized or trusted aggregation mechanism that adds differ-
entially private noise. Moreover, neither servers nor data owners
can collude to deprivatize the data.
Our goal for anonymity is that a data owner is able to transmit
a message such that the message is unable to be linked back to the
data owner. That is, a data owner is anonymous within a group of
data owners, i.e., the anonymity set. The anonymity scheme should
also be robust to traffic analysis. We rely on a public-key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) to thwart sybil attacks. However, the use of PKI does not
preclude anonymity, as data owners remain anonymous within the
anonymity set.
The larger the anonymity set, the stronger the anonymity guar-
antees are for the data owner. For example, if the anonymity set
size is only a dozen, it is straightfoward to either coerce or repri-
mand the small group. The idea is that there is strength in numbers,
and our goal is to build anonymity sets on the order of hundreds of
thousands. Large scale anonymity sets are more difficult to coerce
and breach.
3. PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy has become the gold standard privacy mech-
anism which ensures that the output of a sanitization mechanism
does not violate the privacy of any individual inputs. A privacy
mechanism San() provides ε-differential privacy [24, 26] if, for all
datasets D1 and D2 differing on at most one record, and for all out-
puts O⊆ Range(San()):
Pr[San(D1) ∈ O]≤ eε ×Pr[San(D2) ∈ O] (1)
That is, the probability that a privacy mechansim San produces
a given output is almost independent of the presence or absence of
any individual record in the dataset. In other words, it is difficult
to determine whether any individual record is in the dataset, thus
protecting privacy. The privacy parameter ε controls the tradeoff
between the accuracy of a privacy mechanism and the strength of its
privacy guarantees: smaller ε provides stronger privacy but lower
accuracy, and vice versa.
3.2 Obfuscation
A point function, without loss of generality, for a given input x
outputs y. That is, f (x) = y for the special input x and f (¬x) = 0
for all other inputs.
Point functions are very powerful as it can be shown certain
classes of cryptographic obfuscation can be achieved. That is, given
an obfuscator O for a program P, an obfuscated new program P′
will be produced which has the same functionality as P though has
some definable notions of "opaqueness". This has numerous cryp-
tographic applications from software protection to homomorphic
encryption [3].
In our case, we are interested in a variant of the point function
called a distributed point function. A distributed point function is
a keyed family function that generates multiple shares such that
evaluating the combination of all the shares with the special input x
yields the output y, and 0 for all other inputs. That is, given n keyed
family shares f (xk1)⊕ f (xk2)...⊕ f (xkn) = y.
Distributed point functions (DPF) also have many applications.
DPFs are useful for private information retrieval and private in-
formation storage [31, 18]. We utilize distributed point functions
to achieve anonymous writes such that a data owner can anony-
mously write a single value at a single address, that is perform
write(address,value).
4. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The system, as seen in Figure 1, is composed of data owners
who locally privatize and anonymize their answers before trans-
mitting to the aggregators in response to queries by analysts. We
now describe the data owner privatization mechansims which uti-
lize the randomized response mechanism and then the anonymiza-
tion mechanism which utilizes a technique called function secret
sharing.
4.1 Privacy Mechanism
To ensure that each data owner individually and indepedently
privatizes their answer, we utilize the randomized response mech-
anism. Randomized response [53] was originally created by social
scientists as a mechanism to perform a population study over sensi-
tive attributes (such as drug use or certain ethical behaviors). Ran-
domized response allows data owners to locally randomize their
truthful answer to analyts’ sensitive queries and respond only with
the privatized (locally randomized) answer. We utilize randomized
response as our privacy mechanism as randomized response sat-
isfies the differential privacy guarantee for individual data owners
(see §4.2) and it provides the optimal sample complexity for local
differential privacy mechanisms [23].
So far, the randomized response mechanism has been widely
adopted by both social scientists and computer scientists [53, 28].
There are many different randomized response mechanisms in the
literature. In this section, we present only the mechanism described
in [29] because it strikes a superior balance between the utility
and the privacy guarantee of randomized responses, as compared
to other mechanisms [53, 39, 34, 35].
4.1.1 Mechanism Description
We will now describe how each data owner privatizes their re-
sponse utilizing the randomized response mechanism. Suppose
each data owner has two independently biased coins. Let the first
coin flip heads with probability p, and the second coin flip heads
with probability q. Without loss of generality, in this paper, heads
is represented as “yes” (i.e., 1), and tails is represented as “no” (i.e.,
0).
Each data owner flips the first coin. If it comes up heads, the
data owner responds truthfully; otherwise, the data owner flips the
second coin and reports the result of this second coin flip.
Suppose there are N data owners participating in the population
study. Let Yˆ represent the total aggregate of “yes“ randomized an-
swers. The estimated population with the sensitive attribute YA can
be computed as:
YA =
Yˆ − (1− p)×q×N
p
(2)
The intuition behind randomized response is that it provides “plau-
sible deniability”, i.e., any truthful answer can produce a response
either “yes” or “no”, and data owners retain strong deniability for
any answers they respond. If the first coin always comes up heads,
there is high utility yet no privacy. Conversely, if the first coin is
always tails, there is low utility though strong privacy. As we will
show in the evaluation (see §5), by carefully controlling the bias
of the two coin flips, one can strike a balance between utility and
privacy.
4.1.2 Multiple Sensitive Attributes
While randomized response is an intuitive privacy mechanism
for a single sensitive attribute, naturally the question becomes how
does one deal with multiple sensitive attributes? A host of "poly-
chotomous" mechanisms have been studied and surveyed in the lit-
erature [29] using multiple randomizing mechanisms or maximum
likelihood estimators [51]. However, it turns out that simply repeat-
ing an application of [29] for each sensitive attribute turns out to be
an “optimal” [51] approach.
Thus, PAS-MC repeats the randomized response mechanism for
each sensitive attribute. For example, if a traffic analyst wishes to
understand the traffic flow of a few key locations, the traffic analyst
issues a query that is a Boolean bit-vector asking each data owner
to indicate the location they are at. Then, each data owner performs
randomized response for each location and replies with a Boolean
bit-vector. The traffic analyst then aggregates and sums the bit-
vectors to calculate the number of vehicles at each location.
4.1.3 Utility of Randomized Response
We use two metrics to evaluate the utility, root mean squared
error (RMSE) and relative error. The RMSE gives us an idea of
how much of a fluctuation the privacy mechanism provides over
the population. Relative error gives us an idea of how accurate the
mechanism can be on average.
Suppose the estimated and actual counts of the population of data
owners with the sensitive attribute are Y and YA, respectively. The
utility defined as the RMSE is the square root of the mean of the
square of the errors.
RMSE(Y ) =
√
(
1
N
N
∑
i=1
(YA−Y )2) (3)
Here, a smaller RMSE means that the aggregate privatized re-
sponses will be less likely to vary from the aggregate actual re-
sponses.
Then, the utility defined as the relative error η — the magnitude
of the difference between the actual count and the estimated count,
divided by the magnitude of the actual count.
η =
∣∣Y −YA
Y
∣∣ (4)
Here, smaller relative error η means higher utility of the ran-
domized responses, and vice versa.
4.2 Privacy Guarantee of Randomized Response
Our privacy goal is for a data owner’s response to minimize in-
formation leakage. That is, a “yes” response Y by a data owner
should be as equally likely if the data owner does or does not have
the sensitive attribute A.
Pr[A | Y ] = Pr[¬A | Y ] (5)
It turns out that by carefully controlling each coin bias we can
control this privacy parameter. In our evaluation results we show
for particular values of p and q, the probabilities of having or not
having the sensitive attribute are equally likely §5.1.
Additionally, based on expression 1, the randomized response
mechanism can achieve ε-differential privacy, where:
ε = ln(
Pr[Y |A]
Pr[Y |¬A] ) (6)
Or,
ε = ln(
Pr[Y |¬A]
Pr[Y |A]
) (7)
Whichever is larger. More specifically, the mechanism [29] achieves
ε-differential privacy, where:
ε = ln(
p+(1− p)×q
(1− p)×q ) (8)
That is, if a truthful answer is “yes”, then the randomized answer
will be “yes” with the probability of ‘p+(1− p)× q’. Else, if a
truthful answer is “no”, then the randomized answer will become
“yes” with the probability of ‘(1− p)×q’.
4.3 Discussion of Privacy Approach
It is important to note the following, the queries are signed and
are publicly posted. This ensures that the analysts are held account-
able and are easily auditable. Additionally, data owners have the
ability to view and inspect the query before agreeing to participate
and response to the query. It is easy to visualize location queries by
displaying a map with the points of interests clearly marked. Since
the points of interests should be very busy areas, there is little con-
cern that the data owner would be the only individual at a partic-
ular point reporting their location. Additionally, since an analyst
single query is over multiple locations, the data owners’ response
using a boolean bit vector, the data owner may potentially report
themselves at multiple locations due to the local differential pri-
vacy mechanism. However, in the aggregate the noise is minimal
as we show in the results (see §5.2).
4.4 Anonymous Data Upload
We utilize function secret sharing (FSS) [6] to anonymously up-
load a message with traffic analysis protection. FSS cryptographic
properties hold as long as there is at least one honest server which
does not collude.
The intuition behind FSS to achieve anonymity is as follows.
Recall the distributed point function (DPF) where only one specific
input has an output value and all other inputs are zero §3.2. Using
the DPF, each key is sent to a separate server such that a single key
or even n− 1 keys does not leak the corresponding (x,y) pairing.
Each server then separately evaluates its key over all possible in-
puts. These "evaluations" are then combined with the evaluations
of the other servers to finally generate the (x,y) pair. Naturally, if
there is only one user it’s straightforward to discover what (x,y)
pair was used. However, as long as there are two or more users,
then it’s not possible with chance better than random to discover
which user corresponds to which (x,y) pairing.
We now explain FSS in further detail. Suppose we wish to se-
cretly share a function with p parties where at least one party is
honest. Suppose there is an input x which is n bits and the output
y which is m bits. Given p keys such that the strings are randomly
sampled from the space of {0,1}2n∗m (total number of inputs mul-
tiplied by the size of the message), these strings should evaluate to
the message m whereby f (x) = y such that
⊕p
i= j ki[x] = y. Thus,
in this case p−1 parties are unable to XOR their keys to discover
f (x).
As long as two or more users do not choose the same input
x, each user is able to write their respective message y to input
x. Each user proceeds by sending their keys to each respective
server. Each server then performs a bitwise XOR of the evalua-
tion of every f (xk) over the received key k such that
⊕2n−1
x=0 f (xk).
That is there is a total of 2n evaluations at each server for each
key. Each result of f (xk) is XORed locally at each server result-
ing in an intermediate computation. This intermediate computa-
tion is then shared with each other at the end of the agreed epoch.
Intermediate Results:
Intermediate Results Server1 =
2n−1⊕
x=0
f (xak1)⊕ f (xbk1)...⊕ f (x
p
k1
)
(9)
Intermediate Results Server2 =
2n−1⊕
x=0
f (xak2)⊕ f (xbk2)...⊕ f (x
p
k2
)
(10)
Final Output:
Out put Server1 = Intermediate Results Server1⊕Intermediate Results Server2
(11)
Out put Server2 = Intermediate Results Server2⊕Intermediate Results Server1
(12)
Servers’ Output Should Match
Out put Server1 = Out put Server2 (13)
Additional details regarding the cryptographic techniques and
proofs can be found in the FSS paper [6].
4.5 Disruption Protection
To protect against malformed FSS shares whereby a malicious
data owner may attempt to define an output at multiple input val-
ues, we utilize multiparty computation (MPC). The FSS shares up-
loaded to the servers are then verified by the below MPC protocol
between the servers.
MPC allows a public function to be computed by multiple par-
ties using private inputs, such that each party only knows its own
input and the output of the function, nothing else is revealed [32].
By having the servers perform MPC amongst themselves, we can
uphold the data owner anonymity guarantees as well verify that
the shares are properly formed without relying on data owner co-
ordination and synchronization. Invalid FSS shares can be quickly
XORed out of the intermediate results once they are found, thus
eliminating the pollution from the results.
A valid set of FSS shares would be those that only for the spe-
cial input x does f (x) = y and for all other values of x equals 0.
The following MPC protocol is robust up to n− 1 players being
corrupted, so we assume a computationally bounded adversary and
rely on public-key cryptography.
A straightforward manner to verify the FSS shares is for each
server to evaluate the entire input space over a single FSS share
and then XOR the results together and ensure only one input has
a non-zero output and the remaining outputs are zero. However,
this clearly breaks the anonymity property as all servers know both
1) which data owner sent a corresponding share and 2) what the
output of that particular share is. MPC ensures that the only output
revealed from evaluating the shares is whether it satisfies the point
function rather than revealing the data owner’s message.
We now describe the MPC protocol as follows:
1. Each server evaluates its given FSS share over the total input
space
2. For each evaluation result, each server generates a random
key and XORs this value with the evaluation result generat-
ing an encrypted value
3. Each server then performs a MPC XOR with these values
4. Each server then performs a NXOR over the result and checks
if the value is equal to 0. If its equal to 0, the result is 1, else
the result is 0
5. The results of all the NXORS are then summed
6. The final output of the function is whether the sum of the
results equals to n−1, that is there should be n−1 0′s
The nice part about this computation is that the public func-
tion needs mainly XOR operations and not costly AND operations.
Also, pre-processing and other recent MPC improvements can be
used to ensure efficient computation [41, 20].
5. EVALUATION
5.1 Privacy Leakage
To understand the information leakage that may occur when a
data owner responds “Yes”, we evaluate the conditional probability.
We wish to understand when a data owner answers “Yes”, what
is the probability that the data owner may have or may not have
the sensitive attribute. Adjusting the coin flip bias must be done
with consideration of the estimated population fraction that actually
does have the sensitive attribute. For example, if a large majority of
the population has the sensitive attribute, adjusting the first coin flip
p to a large number such as 0.9 will leak a large deal of information
as the majority of data owners will respond truthfully. However,
as it turns out, if only a small minority of the population has the
sensitive attribute in question, then the first coin flip p can be as
large as 0.9.
For our evaluation, there are a total of 222,704 vehicles with a
maximum of 860 vehicles and a minimum of 1 vehicle at a station.
With a total of 1,157 stations at rush hour, we take the underly-
ing fraction of vehicles at a given station to be 0.005. We evalu-
ate the conditional probability of whether or not a data owner has
or doesn’t have a given sensitive attribute using the coin flip bi-
ases of p=0.995 and q=0.999. The values are given in Table 1 and
show that the two conditional probabilities are essentially equiva-
lent. That is, the information leaked is negligible.
5.2 Accuracy of Privacy Mechanism
To understand the accuracy of our privacy mechanism of ran-
domized response, we evaluate the proposed scheme over the Cal-
ifornia Transportation Dataset[7]. The particular dataset we utilize
collects traffic flow count from under the surface loop detectors in
Sacramento freeways [8].
There are about one thousand stations in this particular district,
and 222,704 vehicles total. We examine both peak (5pm) and off-
peak (3am) traffic times to understand the impact of sparse and
large datasets on our algorithm. We use RMSE and relative error to
evaluate the utility of our approach. The resulting metrics error are
calculated by taking the average error values over each station.
The reporting mechanism works as follows. The query is formu-
lated over every station, i.e., the query is a Boolean bit vector with
each bit represented by an individual station. Each vehicle knows
its location. The vehicle’s actual answer should be True only at a
single index. However, each index in the bit vector represents a
sensitive question asking if a vehicle is at a particular station. Each
vehicle then performs randomized response over each station (rep-
resented by in index in the bit-vector).
Figure 2 shows the results. Table 2 shows that the off-peak rel-
ative error matches the performance of the peak traffic and that the
RMSE is small during off-peak hours. This has several implica-
tions. The first is that we are more interested in performing traffic
rerouting during congestion periods and we can reasonably expect
that we can perform this with low relative error. The second is that
we can achieve our goal of large anonymity sets on the orders of
hundreds of thousands.
5.3 Scaling Effects of Anonymous Data Up-
load
We have implemented PAS-MC using the golang programming
language. The server is running Ubuntu 14.04.1 with 6-core Intel
Xeon E5-2420 @ 2.20GHz CPUs. We use AES-based PRNG.
To understand the scaling effects, we compare with Riposte’s
p-party protocol which also utilizes a distributed point function.
Table 3 shows how PAS-MC is able to quickly scale using the
FSS primitive. Riposte is limited by the DDH-based pseudorandom
generator (PRG), while PAS-MC is not restricted to a particular
PRG thus allowing for much higher throughput. Additionally, the
algorithm is extremely parallelizable so adding additional servers
will see a corresponding throughput increase.
5.3.1 Deployment:
Using the 10-party protocol, we can handle a database size of
512 with 10 servers in about 1 second. To scale to 220,000 users
would require about 430 clusters. A total of 4,300 servers can han-
dle 220,000 users in one second. A total of 70 servers can handle
220,000 users in one minute.
As the FSS primitive is extremely parallelizable, each data owner
would pick uniformly at random an epoch to avoid collisions. If a
data owner is not writing at an epoch, they would pick a dummy
database index to write to. The aggregation of all answers within a
single epoch represents the final result.
6. RELATEDWORK
To uphold data owner privacy while performing analytics, vari-
ous mechanisms have been proposed [42, 50, 40, 24, 26]. Differ-
ential privacy has emerged as the strongest of these privacy mech-
anisms [24, 26]. The core idea of differential privacy is to provide
strong bounds and guarantees on the privacy leakage when mul-
tiple aggregate analytics are run despite the presence or absence
of a single data owner from the dataset. This privacy mechanism is
provided by adding differentially private noise to the aggregrate an-
swer. Differentially private systems have evolved from centralized
databases, which are vulnerable to data breaches, to more mod-
ern distributed data stores. However, these modern approaches
also bring various security vulnerabilities regarding the aggregation
mechanism as they require trusted coordination or a centralized ag-
gregation point.
Recent data analytics systems achieve differential privacy guar-
antees in a distributed setting [25, 36, 16, 1, 15] where each data
owner holds their personal data rather than in a central database.
In these systems, the query answers are indepedently generated
at each data owner’s own device, and then the differential privacy
noise is added to the aggregate answer either collaboratively by the
data owners or by a centralized aggregator. However, these dis-
tributed systems require strong trust assumptions regarding the ag-
gregation mechanism or require expensive zero-knowledge proofs
P(A|Y) 0.501502
P(¬A|Y) 0.498498
ε 5.299313
Table 1: Let Y be the privatized yes response. Let A be whether the data owner has sensitive attribute (data owner is at a particular station).
These values are for p=0.995 and q=0.999.
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Figure 2: Randomized response evaluation for vehicular counts for each vehicle tracking station.
to defend against pollution attacks where even a single data owner
can substantially distort the aggregate result with a single malicious
answer [46, 11].
Furthermore, these prior systems perform a one-time data col-
lection whereby the database remains unchanged during the course
of the query execution (which can stretch up to hours or days).
Data analysts care about timeliness as it is common that data own-
ers’ personal data is constantly changing. As a result, it is cru-
cial that analysts can issue a standing query and get the timely up-
dates continuously, i.e., stream analytics. These “one-shot” analyt-
ics systems cannot provide the required timeliness guarantees for
stream analytics. To adapt them to support stream analytics would
require substantial system changes, and result in unsatisfactory loss
in terms of privacy, utility, or latency.
To overcome the limitations of the aforementioned systems, sev-
eral differentially private stream analytics systems have been pro-
posed recently [27, 10, 9, 49, 46, 30, 11]. These systems inher-
ently consider data owners’ data as streams and can evolve over
time. However, these systems all have technical shortcomings, and
none of them appears practical in real world. One of the first sys-
tems [27] updates the query result only after data owners’ data
changes significantly, and does not support stream analytics over
an unlimited time period. Subsequent systems [10, 11] remove
the limit on the time period, but introduce extra system overheads.
Some systems [49, 46] leverage sophisticated cryptographic oper-
ations to produce noisy aggregate query results, under the assump-
tion that key shares have been distributed among data owners via
expensive secret sharing protocols. These protocols, however, can-
not work at large scale under churn; moreover, in these systems,
even a single malicious data owner can substantially distort the ag-
gregate results without detection. Recently, some other privacy-
preserving distributed stream monitoring systems have been pro-
posed [30, 9, 28]. However, they require some form of synchro-
nization, and/or are tailored for heavy-hitter monitoring only (i.e.,
they can only report on a fraction of the data).
Various anonymity systems have been proposed all with varying
trade-offs regarding throughput and trust assumptions. Chaum’s
Dining Cryptographers [13] was one of the first anonymity systems
which was fully peer-to-peer and is also information-theoretically
anonymous. However, the bandwidth hungry peer-to-peer coordi-
nation and the expensive pollution protection mechanisms severely
limit the scalability. Recent developments such as the Dissent based
systems [54, 19] weaken the trust assumptions slightly to improve
scalability. However, while there is an improvement over the origi-
nal DC-Nets, these systems are still limited by their scalability.
Chaum’s mixnets [12] also was an early anonymity based sys-
tem that subverted traffic analysis. While mixnets only require a
single trusted server, early version of mixes suffered from high-
latency. Tor[22] attempted to solve the latency issue by severely
introducing trust vulnerabilities. A more recent version of Chaum’s
mixnets [14] achieves low-latency though also has trust vulnerabil-
ities. Other recent mixnets are designed to address more real-time
communication [5, 52]. However, these systems are not strong in
their cryptographic guarantees and have multiple vulnerabilities in-
cluding requiring strong network assumptions such as continous
cover traffic, failing to protect against timing analysis when mali-
cious ISPs are involved, requiring the majority of parties to remain
online and inability to tolerate high churn, and incurring excessive
and wasteful bandwidth overheads. In general, to achieve the same
cryptographic guarantees as PAS-MC, expensive zero-knowledge
proofs are required which bounds the latency that can be achieved
in these systems.
Riposte [18] is able to build anonymity sets on the order of mil-
lions by utilizing an audit server and requiring at least 2 honest
servers.. This additional trust assumption greatly improves the scal-
ability. However, the version of Riposte which is similar to PAS-
MC uses a more expensive homomorphic pseudorandom generator.
Riposte takes on the order of days to process compared to PAS-
# Sta-
tions
Avg
Relative
Error
Avg RMSE
Rush
hour
(5pm)
1157 -0.068742 25.091603
Off
hour
(3am)
1017 -0.067416 5.288476
Table 2: Randomized response evaluation for vehicular counts for each vehicle tracking station.
8 party 10 party
Riposte 1 write every 3.44 seconds (8 server cluster,
1,024 row DB)
3 writes every second (10 server cluster, 64 row
DB)
PAS-MC 9 writes every second (1 server cluster, 1,024
row DB)
42 writes every second (1 server cluster, 512
row DB)
Table 3: The message size is 160 bytes. We evaluate PAS-MC on a single server.
MC which can process on the order of seconds. An information-
theoretic approach utilizing Shamir’s secret sharing [48] allows for
the summation of multiple polynomials. The slotted approach as
used in the distributed point function can also be utilized to assign
a single message per data owner. However, as compared to FSS,
Shamir’s secret sharing requires the shares to be at least the size of
the secret itself, while FSS is able to achieve a key size on the order
of the square root of the key size.
7. CONCLUSION
We have presented PAS-MC, a new approach for privacy-preserving
stream analytics. PAS-MC is the first such system, to the best
of our knowledge, that provides all of the following in real-time:
strong privacy guarantees without peer coordination or a central-
ized service, high accuracy, and an anonymity system resistant to
traffic analysis. PAS-MC utilizes randomized response to achieve
distributed differential privacy guarantees and a new cryptographic
primitive named function secret sharing to enable anonymity.
APPENDIX
A. APPENDIX
For soundness we explain the conditional probability calculation
regarding the disclosure of a sensitive attribute. Recall that our pri-
vacy mechanism utilizes randomized response mechanism to pri-
vatize the disclosure of a sensitive attribute. A data owner has two
biased coins that flip heads with probability p and q respectively.
The data owner flips the first coin and if it comes up heads answers
truthfully. If the first coin is tails, the data owner flips the second
coin and replies "Yes" if heads and "No" if tails.
Let piA represent the probability that the data owner has the sen-
sitive attribute. This corresponds to the underlying fraction of the
population which contains the sensitive attribute.
P(Yes) = p×piA +(1− p)×q (14)
P(No) = p× (1−piA)+(1− p)× (1−q) (15)
P(A|Yes) = P(A)×P(Yes|A)
P(Yes)
(16)
P(A|Yes) = piA× (p+(1− p)×q)
p×piA +(1− p)×q (17)
P(¬A|Yes) = P(¬A)×P(Yes|¬A)
P(Yes)
(18)
P(¬A|Yes) = ¬piA× (1− p)×q
p×piA +(1− p)×q (19)
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